Practice: Purpose and Ethos

     The institutions that undergird the functioning of markets in the developing world have come under scrutiny as efforts at development have been less effective than scholars have predicted. While modes of exchange and state/society relations are key to understanding political and economic systems in the developing world, so too are the existing systems of property rights. This article seeks to test and expand the economic theory of property rights with quantitative evidence from litigation in Africa.

This is the first paragraph of the article that provides the context for the study. What situation has Joireman identified?

     It is assumed by scholars of the evolutionary model of property rights, that any modification in property rights will be in the direction of greater specification, culminating in the strictest definition of individual rights, private property [Ault and Rutman, 1979; Barrows and Roth, 1990; Johnson, 1972]. Proponents of this early, economic model of property rights change, such as Prabhu Pingali and Hans Binswanger [1986], base their support on empirical data suggesting that land rights move towards privatisation when population increases. Gershon Feder and Raymond Noronha [1987] recognised that in Africa as land became scarce the definition of land rights on a communal basis was no longer satisfactory for the functioning of the economy [also Feder et al., 1988]. Feder and Noronha observed that in sub-Saharan Africa many tenure systems are moving towards providing security of tenure and the benefits of individualised holding while, in other areas, individualised land holdings were the traditional institution of land tenure. They conclude that individualisation of land holding is necessary to capture the benefits of economically efficient farming. Feder and Noronha support the position that land tenure evolves towards greater economic efficiency with privatisation as the eventual outcome.

What purpose is Joireman accomplishing in this paragraph?

     The article will begin with a very brief sketch of the extant theory of property rights emphasising its applied branch of induced institutional innovation. The mid-section of the article details two historic case studies: Sidama and Hamasien, both areas of Imperial Ethiopia where property rights change occurred when the model predicts, but not in the manner predicted. The final section of the paper investigates what happened in a third area of Imperial Ethiopia that did not correspond to the model of property rights change.

5. What purpose is Joireman accomplishing in this paragraph?

     The public choice model of property rights change emerges out of the thought of North and Thomas [1970] and Davis and North [1971]. The state is viewed as a strategic actor in the development of new property rights, moving to take advantage of new economic opportunities through changes in the rules of the game. The state is viewed to be pursuing its own interests, which are centred on revenue maximisation. The state is not a black box in public choice theory, but an active and independent actor in the economy. These efforts to reconstruct property rights theory in light of new research and changing realities are exciting. Indeed, the new theories answer the call from scholars demanding a more political model of property rights change [Bates, 1990; Firmin-Sellers, 1996]. Yet, there is still a need for refinement in the theory, particularly regarding the role of the state. In the early articulation of property rights theory the state, indeed all political variables, were ignored or assumed. As the theory developed, the public choice literature considered the state to be a player, but one with an interest only in revenue maximisation. This was a laudable improvement in the theory, but the role of the state is not always so obvious.

What purpose is Joireman accomplishing in this paragraph?