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Chapter 7: Interest Groups and Corporations |
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Inequalities of representation and resources are further exaggerated by the ability of some groups to play a central role in the formation and implementation of government policies, based on the membership of these groups in informal networks within the government itself that are involved in policy areas of interest to them. These networks, often called iron triangles, customarily include a private interest group (usually, but not always, a corporation or business trade association), an agency in the executive branch, and committee or subcommittees in Congress, who act together to advance and protect certain government programs that work to the mutual benefit of its members. Though some scholars say that iron triangles have become less important in American government, 1 they seem to be alive and well in shaping and carrying out public policies in the areas of agriculture, defense procurement, public lands, highway construction, and water. Large scale water projects-dams, irrigation, and levees, for example-are supported by farm, real estate developer, construction, and barge-shipping interest groups, members of key Senate and House committees responsible for these projects who can claim credit for bringing jobs and federal money to their constituencies, and the Army Corps of Engineers whose budget and responsibilities grow apace as they build the projects.
1 Scott H. Ainsworth, Analyzing Interest Groups (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002); Berry, The New Liberalism; Allan J. Cigler, "Interest Groups," in William Crotty, ed., Political Science: Looking to the Future, Vol. 4 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1991); Heclo, "Issue Networks"; Robert H. Salisbury, John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, and Robert L. Nelson, "Triangles, Networks, and Hollow Cores;" Mark P. Petracca, "The Rediscovery of Interest Group Politics," in Mark P. Petracca, ed., The Politics of Interests: Interest Groups Transform (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); and Robert M. Stein and Kenneth Bickers, Perpetuating the Pork Barrel: Policy Subsystems and American Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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