Suppose...a willing addict, who would not have things any other way. If the grip of his addiction should somehow weaken, he would do whatever he could to reinstate it; if his desire for the drug should begin to fade, he would take steps to renew its intensity.
Does the addict have free will?
If "having free will" means one can choose to do otherwise, then no, the addict does not have free will; because of his addiction, he cannot choose to do otherwise.
However, Frankfurt provides an alternative account of free will. He suggests that while many creatures have first-order desires (desires to do this or that), it is the presence of additional, second-order desires (desires about desires to do this or that, desires that indicate reflective self-evaluation) that separates "persons" from other creatures. When our will is in accord with those second-order desires, when those desires move us to act in accord with them, then, says Frankfurt, we have free will. One can act freely (do what one wants) and still not have a free will. Consider a dog with no second-order desires who is able to satisfy all her first-order desires - for example, to run whenever and wherever she wants. And one can be unable to act freely and still have a free will. Consider someone unaware that she is unable to do X - she may still quite freely will to do X. Just as free action means one is free to do what one wants, free will means one is free to will what one wants; when you have the will you want to have - when your will conforms to your second-order desires - you have free will. So, Frankfurt says, because the addict is acting according to his second-order desires (he wants to be an addict - he wants to want the drug), he does have a free will. Even though his will is in fact beyond his control, it is nevertheless in accord with his desires.
Sources:
Harry G. Frankfurt. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." Journal of Philosophy 68.1 (1971): 5-20. 19.
Peg Tittle. What If...Collected Thought Experiments in Philosophy. Part 1, Metaphysics: Free Will and Determinism. New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005. 24-25.
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